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My commentary on Jerry Petersen’s paper has a simple structure: First, I will point 
out themes in it that I appreciated and which I would have liked to see more 
thoroughly developed. Secondly, I have some reservations, all of which can be 
subsumed under one heading: I think Petersen advances over a front that is simply 
too broad, and that his campaign would have gained force if he had focused on fewer 
points of attack. 
 
1.  PSEUDO-DEDUCTIVE ECONOMICS 
 
Petersen’s main target is what we might call pseudo-deductive economics, i.e., the 
kind of economic theory or practice that posits one or a few axiomatic assumptions 
and proceeds as if everything that happens in the economic sphere and everything 
that ought to be done in the economy can be deduced from those axioms. They 
include, as is well known, the idea that economic behavior is driven by agents’ 
attempts to maximize utility; that the marketplace, if left to itself, will automatically 
ensure the optimal supply of goods and services at optimal prices; and, essentially 
that this mechanism will automatically see to it that all individuals’ needs and 
interests are optimally fulfilled.  
 The claim that the current economic crisis, as a whole or in part, ultimately 
resulted from decision-makers’ unwarranted reliance on these doctrines is the point 
of departure in Petersen’s paper, and in support of it he cites a statement by the 
former head of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan. I find Greenspan’s admission 
deeply interesting, and I would have liked more substantiation of the idea that 
decision-makers by their own admission used, or were seduced by, pseudo-
deductivist economic rhetoric in implementing or recommending disastrous 
policies. That in itself would certainly deserve a paper or even a book. 
 
2.  ADAM SMITH: PSEUDO-DEDUCTIVISM AS ENGAGING RHETORICAL STRATEGY  
 
Next, I am thrilled when Petersen points out that Adam Smith, who supposedly 
fathered the classic pseudo-deductivist doctrines, was in fact a much more nuanced 
or ambiguous thinker who took an “overtly rhetorical and less dogmatic approach in 
his Wealth of Nations,” yet also “admired the use of first principles as a professor of 
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rhetoric and advocated it to his students.” Petersen, interestingly, quotes Smith as 
saying that it “gives us pleasure to see the phenomena which we reckoned the most 
unaccountable, all deduced from some principle.” Again, a paper or a book might 
build on this idea alone. And I would like it to tell us whether Smith the rhetorician 
pointed to pseudo-deductivism as a powerful rhetorical strategy precisely because, 
as he says, it gives “pleasure” (to the rhetor as well as to his audience, we might 
add), while at the same time, as an economist, he had the sense to see that unallayed 
deduction from “some principle” misrepresents the world? Petersen instructively 
illustrates the apparent contradiction between deductivism and inductivism in 
Smith. I would have liked Petersen to further explore the suggestion that Smith does 
not just expound a bit of each, but that deductivism is to him merely and precisely a 
rhetorical strategy; something like this seems to me to be indicated in Petersen’s 
other quote from Smith, which states that the method using “first principles” is 
“undoubtedly the most philosophical, and in every science, whether of Morals or 
Natural Philosophy, etc., is vastly more ingenious, and for that reason more 
engaging, than the other.” Notice the word “engaging.” Is this statement, as Petersen 
has it, really a “glowing appraisal of Newton’s method” – or is it rather a rhetorical 
assessment of the pseudo-deductive method’s enormous potential appeal to certain 
minds, its capacity to “engage” and perhaps even to seduce? And is pseudo-
deductivism in fact Newton’s method? That question is one I will return to.  
At any rate, we have here the seed of a hypothesis that might help explain 
why pseudo-deductivism in a discipline like economics has held the sway that it has: 
It holds a unique psychological appeal to those who expound it as well as to many of 
those who hear it or read it. Promising projects for rhetoricians here would be, first, 
to demonstrate through textual analysis that the “pleasure” derivable from 
deductivist doctrines in fact explains much of their power to “engage” and hence to 
persuade; second, to analyze the exact nature of this pleasure-yielding mechanism; 
and then, to discuss what sorts of personalities and what sorts of disciplines, in what 
sorts of situations, are in particular susceptible to this appeal.  
 
3.  SCIENCE AS INVENTION? 
 
I also liked Petersen’s discussion of the Pluto’s exemplary demotion from planet 
status. I accept this story as showing that definitions in science are, in Alan Gross’s 
terms, inventions rather than discoveries: For example, scientists choose to define a 
planet as an object that has certain properties including ‘roundness,’ and 
furthermore they can and must decide, arbitrarily, how much of this vague property 
the object must have to qualify as ‘round.’ In short, the idea of a planet is not an 
immutable essence. Pluto refutes Plato. 
But everything in science is not “invention” in the same sense as the 
definition of a planet. Science is made of other things as well, for example, 
observations. It is true that some observations are, as Petersen and Richard Rorty 
would say, “fudged” in order to fit definitions or deductive theories, and some 
observations are pure inventions – but some are not.  
On the whole, I suspect that Petersen’s has chosen to proceed on an unduly 
broad front in his campaign to show that science belongs to those “uses of language 
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that persuade and construct a vision of reality.” An important reservation I have is 
that Petersen cites Newton as the great model for pseudo-deductivist theories. This 
may be true historically, but it is misleading to imply that Newton was a deductivist. 
He did not set up his laws as axiomatic first principles and then deduce everything 
from them. Newton was not Descartes. Newton’s laws are theories that he derived 
from empirical observations. Notice that Smith talks about first principles of two 
kinds: “primary, or proved.” Newton’s were not primary. They were simple 
equations that accounted extremely well for a body of observations built up over 
many decades. These included the Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe’s meticulous 
charting of planetary movements, which allowed Johannes Kepler, at enormous 
effort, to theorize that planets move in ellipses, with the sun at one focus. Newton, 
among many other seminal ideas, then proposed the law of universal gravity which 
explains these movements with reference to a centripetal force – gravity - inversely 
proportional to the square of the radius vector. He also showed that the same 
principle, expressed in a simple equation, may explain a host of other observations.  
The idea that one simple force, expressed in simple mathematical terms, may 
ultimately explain all mechanical movements in the universe was, as we know, 
intensely stimulating and engaging to subsequent scientists and intellectuals and 
kindled their desire for explanatory laws of similarly engaging beauty and simplicity 
in other areas of human knowledge. Stephen Toulmin and now Jerry Petersen have 
pointed out how misguided and even disastrous this desire has been. But the fact 
remains that Newton’s principle were not ‘first’ in the sense of being axioms; they 
were based on countless previous observations and calculations, and it stood up as 
compatible with countless subsequent ones. By contrast, the axioms of pseudo-
deductive economics can claim neither of these merits.  
This difference also explains why Newton’s theories were eventually, in a 
sense, falsified by relativity. They had never been “proved” because scientific 
theories cannot be.  They were seen to be brilliant approximations that hold under 
most circumstances. By contrast, pseudo-deductive economics is treated by many of 
its true believers as a self-sealing system immune to falsification. In their eyes, 
nothing that has happened or could possibly happen will ever disprove it. 
 
4. RHETORIC: LEGITIMATE, NECESSARY AND SEDUCTIVE  
 
It is certainly useful to be reminded that there is rhetoric and persuasion in science, 
and the study and criticism of it is fascinating and important. But I suggest we stop 
short of defining rhetoric in science so broadly that rhetoric becomes all there is to 
it. There is also observation, and there is deduction, as well as induction, abduction, 
experimentation, intuition and a lot more. I suggest we adopt Perelman’s definition 
rhetoric, which sees rhetoric as persuasion about issues where there is no access to 
deductive or compelling proof. Empirical science has no access to prove its theories 
deductively; and that is where rhetoric comes in. So rhetoric is necessary in science. 
Some of it is useful, some of it illuminating, but some of it is seductive or downright 
false. Scientific rhetoric may be most appealing and hence seductive, to some minds, 
when someone pretends that deductive inference from axioms will work in a field 
that appears otherwise intractable.  
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This is what we have seen in pseudo-deductive economics, and that is a 
reason why need analysts like Petersen to make us aware of it.  
 
